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ABSTRACT 
Hacking password databases is one of the most frequently reported cyber-attacks. Current password 
management systems are based on known and public algorithms. Also, many studies have shown that users 
select weak passwords. Thus, with the emergence of new powerful computing devices, the passwords based 
on known algorithms can be disclosed. Using physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for increasing the security 
level of password management systems is a quite recent method that is proposed to solve this problem.  In 
this method, Addressable PUF Generator (APG) is added to the conventional password management systems. 
This report is aimed at implementing the password generation scheme using SRAM-based PUF. The bit error 
is indeed the main issue with using PUFs is addresses in this paper. To solve this issue, Ternary Addresseble 
PUF Generator is used.  
1 Introduction 
 Traditional password (PW) management systems have used the mapping of passwords that were based on 
the known and public algorithms like hashing and salting [1]. However, research shows that most of the users 
choose common and weak passwords [2-5].  Thus, with the emergence of new powerful GPUs and computing 
devices, the PWs can be disclosed by brute force attacks. Another method that has been used in the literature 
is encrypting a PW with a key saving them in a database. However, the problem with this method is that when 
the key is disclosed, the PWs are also disclosed. Several systems and methods have been proposed in the 
literature on using physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for password generator systems to improve the level 
of security. In this method, Addressable PUF Generator (APG) works as a hardware protection layer. This 
hardware layer can be added to the software layer that can is commonly used in the PW generator systems. 
Using APG leads to both cost reduction and security improvement. The organization of the remainder of this 
document is: Section 2 contains background information about Ternary SRAM PUF, and hash-based PW 
management/generation schemes. Section 3 includes detailed information about the system design of 
including the protocol. Part 4 will focus on implementation and the results. 
2 Background 
2.1 PUF Designs  
Many forms of PUFs have been designed in the past, which are reviewed . One type of PUFs is memory-
based PUF like SRAM [6, 7] or MRAM PUF [8]. There is an increasing interest in memory-based PUFs since 
it is possible to make them from memories already existing in many systems. The other advantage of this kind 
of PUFs over conventional PUFs, is their size and speed, while they need less power comparing to traditional 
PUFs. Besides, the size of the required PUF is insignificant comparing to the size of the whole memory. Thus, 
the location of the used PUF can be another secret information, which increases security, when a hacker gets 
access to the memory. Using memory cells for designing PUFs in security protocol has been used a lot in the 
previous bodies of research.  
2.1.1 SRAM-PUF 
Static random-access memory (SRAM) PUFs were discovered, based on the original SRAMs 
independently and concurrently, by Holcomb [9]et al. [9, 10] and Guajardo et al. [11]. As shown in Fig.  1, a 
typical SRAM cell contains two cross-coupled inverters at its core with two stable states. The random physical 
mismatch between two is controlled by the power-up behavior, which itself is determined by the 
manufacturing variability. During power-up, some cells prefer storing 0, and some prefer storing 1. Responses 
of a PUF are the same in different cycles for these kinds of cells [12, 13].  
 
 
Fig.  1 SRAM Cell, Source: Adapted from [9-14] 
 
 
 
  
 2.2 Addressable PUF Generator (APG) 
The structure of Addressable PUF Generator (APG) [15, 16] is shown in Fig.  2. In this architecture, the 
controller sends an address XY to the memory array to read cells from which challenges and responses are 
generated. As described in [15, 16], APG can be used to create temporary passwords and authenticate users. 
 
Fig.  2 Block Diagram of the APG, Source [17]  
2.3 Ternary PUFs 
The idea of ternary PUF is to select only the stable cells to generate the PUF output and ignore the other 
cells.  In this section, the method of identifying fuzzy cells in both ternary SRAM and MRAM PUFs are 
discussed. 
2.3.1 Ternary SRAM PUF 
As mentioned before, the method to generate PUFs from SRAM arrays is to subject the device to power-
off power-on cycles. A significant proportion of the cells always is read as either "0" or a "1". However, a few 
numbers of SRAM cells have a weak preference or no particular preference at all [17]. Thus, the responses of 
the PUF is not stable for these cells, which are known as fuzzy cells.  The number of fuzzy bits divided by the 
total number of bits in the pattern is defined as the SRAM PUF noise [18]. An intuitive approach to solve the 
issue with fuzzy cells is to read the PUF cells repeatedly and chose only those cells that always provide the 
same output. In the characterizing (enrollment) phase, the SRAM-PUF cells are read hundreds of times by 
repeating the power-off power-on cycles. In each cycle of reading, the unstable cells are specified that have 
different responses against their previous response and denoted by an "X" mark. In this way, it is possible to 
recognize the cells that can generate stable "0" and "1" and remove those with the "X". The higher number of 
reads is accompanied by creating a more stable challenge. From now on, only stable PUF cells generate a 
stable response [19].  
3 Protocol 
This report focuses mainly on explaining the implantation of the PW generator with APG shown in Fig.  
3.   
 The architecture input is user ID (ID hereafter) and Password (PW hereafter) of the user. The main output 
of APG that is shown in Fig.  3 is the PUF response [19]. The response of PUF is generated through the 
following steps: 
Step 1- ID and PW are the input of Addressable PUF Generator. Message Digest (MD) of PW is calculated 
in microcontroller (MCU) with software SHA2-256. 
Step 2- The MD of the PW is the input of the "Expander block" in Fig.  3. The details about the Expander 
block are shown in Fig.  4. The output of the hash (or the input of Expander block) is 32 bytes, 256 bits. Since 
the size of the used SRAM PUF is 8 kilobytes, 16 bits are needed for addressing a specific SRAM cell. Also, 
the input of the Expander block, which is 256 bits, can only point to 16 independent addresses. Therefore, the 
extracted challenge would be 16 bit, which ends with low entropy. Thus, we cannot cover enough number of 
users. Expander block is designed for increasing the entropy. Increasing the entropy is done by generating 
longer MD from the original MD. As can be seen in Fig.  4, the left two bytes of the MD are rotated eight 
times. Then, all the results of shifting MD will be the inputs of SHA2-256, as shown in Fig.  4. The longer 
message digest is 256 bytes, which are the concatenation of 8 message digests. These 256 are enough to 
generate a 128-bit challenge/response stream and provide high entropy.  
 
 
Step 3- The outputs of "Expander block" are 128 addressees of SRAM cells. These addresses include the 
address of fuzzy cells 
Step 4- The outputs of "Expander block" is revised in the Masking block (Masking fuzzy cells). In this 
block, the addresses of the fuzzy cells are ignored. The next non-fuzzy cell after each fuzzy cell is considered 
for extracting the challenge or response of PUF. The output of the masking block is 128 addresses.  
Step 5- Each bit of PUF response is obtained in 128 addresses generated in Step 4. Therefore, the response 
of PUF is 128 bit, as shown in Fig.  3. 
 
Fig.  3 The implemented architecture for APG with wifire and 1Mbit Cypress SRAM  
 Fig.  4 Details of "Expander block" shown in Fig.  3 [19] 
4 Implementation and results 
The APG is implemented using WiFire development boards from Digilent, powered by Microchip [20] 
and 1-MBIT CYPRESS SRAM[21], as shown in Fig.  5. The SRAM part number is CY7C1021CV26, which 
is a 1Mbit SRAM arranged in 64 K words every 16 bits. A similar protocol [19] for SAMV71 MCU with 
Cortex M7 core and 32 Kbyte SRAM is revised to make it compatible with wifire board. The coding 
environment for coding is Arduino IDE due to its simplicity. The functions used in the code and the result of 
each function are explained briefly in the next coming sections. 
 
Fig.  5 APG device developed by NAU cyber security Lab  
4.1 Receiving data 
At the beginning of the program, the ID and password (PW) is sent to microcontroller (MCU) which is 
WiFire board. MCU captures and echo every single received byte and then the ID and PW in the HEX format 
to the terminal. The codes in Fig.  6  shows how the data is received, echo back and printed in hex format for 
ID string: 
  Serial.print("\n\r\n\r Enter your ID\n\r"); 
  recv_char = 0; 
  i_counter = 0; 
  while ((recv_char != '\n') && (recv_char != '\r') && (i_counter < MSG_SIZE)) 
  { 
    if(Serial.available()) 
    { 
      recv_char = Serial.read(); 
      Serial.write(recv_char);          // echo to terminal 
      id_buff[i_counter++] = recv_char; // queue character into buffer 
    } 
  } 
  id_buff[i_counter-1] = '\0';          // the last character was enter, then replace it with NULL 
  id_size = i_counter-1; 
 
Fig.  6 Code used for receiving data of the user 
The result of this step is shown in Fig.  7  
 
Fig.  7 Results of receiving and printing the ID and PW 
4.2 Processing data and making the address 
The results of steps that occur in the "Expander block" are shown in Fig.  8 and Fig.  9. These results are 
obtained after entering "PasswordManagementWithWifire" and "1-Mbit SRAM" as the "Username" and 
"Password". As previously mentioned, the output of the hash digest (or the input of the Expander block in 
Fig.  3) is 32 bytes. As can be seen in Fig.  4, the two most significant bytes of the MD is rotated 8 times. 
Then, all the results of shifting MD will be the inputs of SHA2-256, as shown in Fig.  4. The results of these 
eight messages digest are shown in Fig.  9.  
 
Fig.  8 Rotating the first two bytes of the password MD 
 
Fig.  9 Message digests from hashing of shifted results  
Finally, 8 MD (each MD is 32 Bytes) results that are shown in Fig.  9 will be concatenated to generate long 
MD in Expander block. Therefore, the length of Long MD is 8*32 = 256 Bytes, which is used to generated 
"128 Addresses for extracting PUF Response". Since just 8 kilobytes of SRAM is used as PUF, we need 16 
(2 bytes) bits for addressing a specific cell. Thus, we will have 256/2=128 addresses, which are shown in Fig.  
10. 
 
 
Fig.  10 Generating "128 Addresses for extracting PUF Response" after Masking the fuzzy cells 
Each bit of the challenge/Response is extracted in 128 addresses as shown in Fig. eee. The extracted 
SRAM-PUF response is shown in Fig.  11. 
Fig.  11 128 bit PUF response extracted in 128 addresses shown in Fig.  10 
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